17 June 2014
Shailesh Vara opens the debate on the Second Reading of the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill.

Mr Vara: May I say at the outset that I propose to speak first to the Government amendments and then to let hon. Members speak to their amendments, to which I will reply at the end of this debate?

Clause 62 creates a permission stage for statutory challenges under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 in relation to English matters. In Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill) tabled a number of technical amendments that sought to tidy up and harmonise procedures across the planning regime. I responded that we needed more time to properly consider the amendments.

Following further consideration and discussions with my hon. Friend and the Under-Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, my hon. Friend the Member for Grantham and Stamford (Nick Boles), who has responsibility for planning, the Government now seek to advance proposals to extend the permission stage to other planning-related statutory challenges; to simplify procedures to enable challenges to costs awards connected to some planning and listed building decisions to be challenged as part of the same application; and to standardise the start time for various planning-related statutory challenges.

Amendment 1, new clause 52 and new schedule 3 omit clause 62 and replace it with a new clause and schedule that set out where leave of the court is required to bring planning-related statutory challenges. The amendments to section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act that were originally set out in clause 62 affected only challenges to decisions concerning English matters. The amendments in this new schedule are broader, ensuring that the leave requirement applies in all section 288 cases.

The new schedule also requires leave of the court before challenges can be brought to a range of planning-related decisions, orders, actions and documents. It will affect section 287 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, which relates to challenges to decisions concerning simplified planning zones, highways and rights of way orders, and relief of statutory undertakers from obligations. It will also affect section 63 of the Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990, which concerns challenges to listed building consent procedures; section 22 of the Planning (Hazardous Substances) Act 1990, which relates to challenges to hazardous substance consent decisions; and, finally, section 113 of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004, which relates to challenges to development plans.

It makes sense to have consistency across these different types of challenges and I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst for bringing the issue to my attention. I agree with him that requiring leave in some types of cases but not in others could create difficulties for the new planning court, at a time when we are trying to make things simpler and speed up planning cases. The efficiency of the court system is a matter for Government to consider across both England and Wales, and these amendments apply to the whole jurisdiction.

New clause 52 and new schedule 3 also permit challenges to awards of costs relating to planning and listed building decisions to be brought as part of the substantive challenge under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act or section 63 of the Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act.

At the moment, when an award of costs is made, it can be challenged only through an application for judicial review. That is separate to the application for statutory review of the substantive decision. Allowing costs to be challenged as part of the section 288 or section 63 challenge would remove the need for an aggrieved party to make two separate applications to the High Court and pay two separate filing fees.

New clause 13 standardises the date from which various challenges may be brought to the day after the relevant decision has been made. Planning challenges have to be brought within six weeks. Moving the start time to the day after the decision date is consistent with the approach taken in the civil procedure rules for judicial review claims. This is a harmonisation measure designed to assist in the smooth working of the new planning court and to reduce the scope for error by claimants.

I urge the House to accept amendment 1, new clauses 13 and 52, and new schedule 3.

| Hansard

| Parliament TV

 

Mr Vara: I thank all those who have contributed to the debate, and I hope that I can put on the record at least some of the points that I wish to make before the clock runs out at 2.39 pm. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill) and, through him, the legal fraternity for all their help in ensuring that we have tidied up some matters relating to planning.

2.30 pm

My right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (Mr Redwood) raised several issues. I am mindful of the time, but I will deal with a couple of them. First, last year we reduced the six-week limit from three months. Secondly, as far as paragraph 4(7) of new schedule 3 is concerned, if an order were to be suspended pending the outcome of judicial review proceedings, developers would be free to remove the tree, which would make the whole issue academic.

Judicial review is an important subject. The package of reform to which clauses 55 to 61 relate is designed to reduce the potential for judicial review to be misused in order to hinder and delay perfectly lawful decisions, while protecting the rule of law. Mere technicalities that were highly unlikely to have made a difference to the outcome for the applicant should not be an adequate basis on which to bring a claim and halt a process. At present, as developed in case law, the courts dismiss a case on a “no difference” basis only where the end result would inevitably have been the same. That extremely high threshold allows judicial reviews to be brought on technicalities that would, in practice, have made no difference to the result or to the applicant. That is why we wish to modify the current approach.

Clause 55 requires the court to refuse permission or a remedy where the grounds for the judicial review would have been highly unlikely to have caused a substantially different outcome for the applicant. I reassure hon. Members that clause 55 will not make the exercise of that power routine. “Highly likely” will remain a high threshold, which will not be met if there is any significant doubt that there might have been a difference for the applicant. Consequently, the clause is far from being a “get out of jail free” card for administrators that would allow them to act unlawfully.

Amendment 23 would delete the clause and maintain the current position. Taken together, amendments 24 to 28, 31 and 32 would also maintain the current position by replacing the duty on the court with a power and by replacing the “highly likely” test with one of “inevitable”. I have already set out our basis for the clause, and I trust that I have assured hon. Members of the high threshold that the clause maintains. Replacing “may” with “must” would significantly weaken the utility of the clause for dealing with minor technicalities in a proportionate manner, and it would continue the recipe for judicial reviews brought on minor technicalities to hinder progress.

Mr Slaughter: I hope that the Minister will not read a prepared speech but address a subject that was raised in the debate, which the hon. Member for Halesowen and Rowley Regis (James Morris) rather gave away, namely that the clauses remove the existing balance in the system and weight it in favour of the stronger party. Rather than talking to the chief executive of the local authority, why does the Minister not talk to the care home resident, the small business that is being pulled down because of planning regulations or the homeless person who is not being taken in? Those are the people who are disadvantaged. They are not meritless cases, but people who do not have the necessary resources.

Mr Vara: I am addressing the issues concerned. I am sorry that the hon. Gentleman does not like them, but that does not mean that I will not address them. As for making proper speeches, given the personal attacks that he made when he spoke, perhaps he should have better regard for the etiquette of the House. I will not take any lectures from him.

Amendments 29 and 30 probe the scope of clause 55. In practice, the clause will bite on minor procedural defects, because more significant defects will not be highly unlikely to have made a difference to the outcome for the applicant. There is no accepted definition of “procedural defects”, and it would be virtually impossible to arrive at a definition that would stand the test of time because judicial review evolves with each new decision.

I turn to clauses 56 to 61, which will rebalance the financial aspects of judicial review. Those involved in bringing judicial reviews should not be able to hide behind a claimant of limited means or an off-the-shelf company to avoid appropriate liability at the taxpayer’s expense. I do not accept that clauses 56 and 57 will prevent meritorious judicial reviews from being brought. As now, non-party funders will be liable only where they also seek to drive or control the litigation in some way.

Clause 58 establishes two presumptions concerning persons who voluntarily intervene in a judicial review: first, that the court must order an intervener in judicial review proceedings to pay their own costs; and, secondly, that the court must order the intervener to pay the reasonable costs that their intervention has caused a party to incur. Where there are exceptional circumstances, the court need not make an order. Amendment 35 would remove the clause in its entirety, and amendments 36 and 37 would remove the second presumption. Amendment 51, which draws from the Supreme Court rules, would allow the court to award costs against an intervener only in exceptional circumstances.

The first presumption—that an intervener will pay their own costs—represents the current position. Interveners already almost invariably cover their own costs. On the second presumption—that an intervener will pay costs they cause a party to incur—it is right that all interventions should be carried out appropriately and reasonably. The Government share the view that interveners add value to proceedings, and clause 58 is not intended to prevent interventions. However, those who intervene should properly consider the cost implications of doing so.

I know that the clause has caused some disquiet and I agreed in Committee to consider further the second presumption, having listened carefully to the points made, particularly those by my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert). I wish to record my gratitude to him for his assistance, and I believe his proposed amendment reflects, in part, what we want to achieve. Although we are not in a position to accept the amendments, we are looking seriously at how to ensure that interveners consider carefully the cost implications of intervening, without deterring those who intervene in appropriate cases and add value. I am happy to commit to continuing discussions to consider further whether the clause needs to be redrafted to target the specific behaviours that we want to address.

I shall now speak to clauses 59 to 61, which establish a codified costs capping regime in judicial review proceedings, building on the regime that has been developed by the courts through case law. The usual costs position should be circumvented only in exceptional, meritorious cases involving serious issues of the highest public interest that otherwise would not be taken forward. We are concerned that costs capping orders can currently be made at any stage of a case. If an order is made at an early stage and a judge later decides that the case has no merit and does not grant permission for it to go any further, the claimant will be protected from having to pay the defendant’s costs of defending that unmeritorious claim.

A number of points have been raised by colleagues. I simply say that with judicial review, we are trying to ensure that meritorious claims go ahead. It is unmeritorious claims that we are trying to deal with, such as those where people hide behind a shelf company, or where people front an application for other individuals who are actually behind it and driving it. We want to maintain judicial reviews for meritorious cases, but we want to ensure that unmeritorious claims are dealt with appropriately. We also want to ensure proportionality by making those who wish to intervene take account of the costs, particularly when some of those costs are to be borne by others.

| Hansard

| Parliament TV